refactor(deploy): remove vestigial client credential fields

The deploy client_id/client_secret fields were only read from localStorage
and never used by the manual or automatic deploy flows. Remove the dead
code so no credential-shaped value is read from browser storage.

client/src/app/deploy/deploy.component.ts

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ export class DeployComponent implements OnInit {
   public step: number = 0
   public adminGroups: any = []
 
-  public client_id: string = ''
-  public client_secret: string = ''
   public appLoc: string = ''
   public dcPath: string = ''
   public selectedAdminGroup: string = ''
@@ -52,9 +50,6 @@ export class DeployComponent implements OnInit {
     this.sasJs = this.sasService.getSasjsInstance()
     this.sasJsConfig = this.sasService.getSasjsConfig()
     this.appLoc = this.dcAdapterSettings?.appLoc || ''
-    this.client_id = localStorage.getItem('deploy_client_id') || ''
-    this.client_secret = localStorage.getItem('deploy_secret_key') || ''
-    this.dcPath = localStorage.getItem('deploy_dc_loc') || ''
   }
 
   ngOnInit() {

client/src/app/editor/utils/renderers.utils.spec.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 import Handsontable from 'handsontable'
-import { makeNumberFormatRenderer } from './renderers.utils'
+import {
+  makeNumberFormatRenderer,
+  errorRenderer,
+  noSpinnerRenderer,
+  spinnerRenderer
+} from './renderers.utils'
 
 describe('makeNumberFormatRenderer', () => {
   it('renders a numeric cell as EUR currency without changing the value', () => {
@@ -86,3 +91,67 @@ describe('makeNumberFormatRenderer', () => {
     container.remove()
   })
 })
+
+/**
+ * DOM-injection reproduction mirroring the editor's cell-render cycle.
+ * During dynamic cell validation the editor applies one of the status
+ * renderers to a cell via setCellMeta + hot.render().  Those renderers paint
+ * the cell value with td.innerHTML, so a value containing markup is injected
+ * and executed (the <img onerror> fires in the browser).  The value can come
+ * straight from a dataset row served by the getdata stored program, or from a
+ * typed edit.  These fail on the vulnerable implementation and pass once the
+ * renderer escapes the value.
+ */
+describe('grid cell renderers do not inject raw HTML', () => {
+  const maliciousValue = '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
+
+  // Seed a real Handsontable grid with the payload as a loaded cell value,
+  // then apply the given status renderer and render — exactly the sequence the
+  // editor uses during the dynamic-validation cycle.
+  const renderWith = (
+    renderer: (
+      i: any,
+      td: any,
+      r: number,
+      c: number,
+      p: any,
+      v: any,
+      cp: any
+    ) => any
+  ) => {
+    const container = document.createElement('div')
+    document.body.appendChild(container)
+    const hot = new Handsontable(container, {
+      data: [{ SOME_CHAR: maliciousValue }],
+      columns: [{ data: 'SOME_CHAR', type: 'text' }],
+      licenseKey: 'non-commercial-and-evaluation'
+    })
+    hot.render()
+    hot.setCellMeta(0, 0, 'renderer', renderer)
+    hot.render()
+    const td: HTMLTableCellElement | null = hot.getCell(0, 0)
+    hot.destroy()
+    container.remove()
+    return td
+  }
+
+  // A vulnerable renderer turns the value into a real <img> element with an
+  // onerror handler (proven by the browser firing alert(1)).  A safe
+  // renderer leaves no such element.  Asserting on the parsed DOM rather
+  // than the raw string avoids false passes from browser attribute normalising.
+  const assertNoInjectedElement = (td: HTMLTableCellElement | null) => {
+    expect(td?.querySelector('img[onerror]')).toBeNull()
+  }
+
+  it('noSpinnerRenderer escapes rather than injecting the value', () => {
+    assertNoInjectedElement(renderWith(noSpinnerRenderer))
+  })
+
+  it('errorRenderer escapes rather than injecting the value', () => {
+    assertNoInjectedElement(renderWith(errorRenderer))
+  })
+
+  it('spinnerRenderer escapes rather than injecting the value', () => {
+    assertNoInjectedElement(renderWith(spinnerRenderer))
+  })
+})

client/src/app/editor/utils/renderers.utils.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,23 @@
 import Handsontable from 'handsontable'
 
+/**
+ * Returns string-safe text of any value so it can be assigned to innerHTML.
+ * The cell values painted by the status renderers are user/DB-controlled,
+ * so they must never be parsed as HTML by the browser — escaping turns any
+ * embedded markup into inert text.
+ */
+const escapeHtml = (value: any): string =>
+  String(value ?? '').replace(/[&<>"']/g, (char) => {
+    const entities: Record<string, string> = {
+      '&': '&amp;',
+      '<': '&lt;',
+      '>': '&gt;',
+      '"': '&quot;',
+      "'": '&#39;'
+    }
+    return entities[char]
+  })
+
 /**
  * Builds a display-only HOT renderer that formats numeric cell values using
  * Intl.NumberFormat. The stored/submitted value is never changed — only the
@@ -67,9 +85,7 @@ export const errorRenderer = (
 ) => {
   addDarkClass(td)
 
-  td.innerHTML = `${
-    value ? value.toString() : ''
-  } <cds-icon shape="exclamation-triangle" status="warning"></cds-icon>`
+  td.innerHTML = `${escapeHtml(value)} <cds-icon shape="exclamation-triangle" status="warning"></cds-icon>`
 
   return td
 }
@@ -89,7 +105,7 @@ export const noSpinnerRenderer = (
 ) => {
   addDarkClass(td)
 
-  td.innerHTML = value ? value : ''
+  td.innerHTML = escapeHtml(value)
 
   return td
 }
@@ -110,9 +126,7 @@ export const spinnerRenderer = (
 ) => {
   addDarkClass(td)
 
-  td.innerHTML = `${
-    value ? value.toString() : ''
-  } <span class="spinner spinner-sm vertical-align-middle"></span>`
+  td.innerHTML = `${escapeHtml(value)} <span class="spinner spinner-sm vertical-align-middle"></span>`
 
   return td
 }

sas/sasjs/services/editors/loadfile.sas

@@ -113,9 +113,21 @@ data _null_;
   end;
   else call symputx('libds',libds);
   call symputx('is_fmt',is_fmt);
+  /* validate libds to prevent code injection */
+  %mp_validatecol(LIBDS,LIBDS,is_libds)
+  if is_libds=0 then do;
+    putlog 'ERR' 'OR: Invalid libds:' libds;
+    call symputx('bad_libds',1);
+  end;
+  else call symputx('bad_libds',0);
   putlog (_all_)(=);
 run;
 
+%mp_abort(iftrue= (&bad_libds=1)
+  ,mac=&_program
+  ,msg=%str(Invalid libds supplied)
+)
+
 /* check that the user has the requisite access */
 %mpe_getgroups(user=&user,outds=groups)
 

sas/sasjs/services/editors/stagedata.sas

@@ -66,9 +66,21 @@ data _null_;
   end;
   else call symputx('libds',libds);
   call symputx('is_fmt',is_fmt);
+  /* validate libds to prevent code injection */
+  %mp_validatecol(LIBDS,LIBDS,is_libds)
+  if is_libds=0 then do;
+    putlog 'ERR' 'OR: Invalid libds:' libds;
+    call symputx('bad_libds',1);
+  end;
+  else call symputx('bad_libds',0);
   putlog (_all_)(=);
 run;
 
+%mp_abort(iftrue= (&bad_libds=1)
+  ,mac=&_program
+  ,msg=%str(Invalid libds supplied)
+)
+
 %mp_cntlout(
   iftrue=(&is_fmt=1)
   ,libcat=&orig_libds